State of Utah v. Timothy Kent Redmond : Brief of Appellant by Utah Court of Appeals
Brigham Young University Law School
BYU Law Digital Commons
Utah Court of Appeals Briefs
1995
State of Utah v. Timothy Kent Redmond : Brief of
Appellant
Utah Court of Appeals
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_ca1
Part of the Law Commons
Original Brief Submitted to the Utah Court of Appeals; digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law
Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, Brigham Young University, Provo, Utah; machine-generated
OCR, may contain errors.
Jan C. Graham; Attorney General; Jim Beadles; Assistant Attorney General; Attorneys for Plaintiff-
Appellee.
Mark T. Ethington; Day & Barney; Attorney for Defendant-Appellant.
This Brief of Appellant is brought to you for free and open access by BYU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Utah Court of
Appeals Briefs by an authorized administrator of BYU Law Digital Commons. Policies regarding these Utah briefs are available at
http://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/utah_court_briefs/policies.html. Please contact the Repository Manager at hunterlawlibrary@byu.edu with
questions or feedback.
Recommended Citation
Brief of Appellant, Utah v. Redmond, No. 950338 (Utah Court of Appeals, 1995).
https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_ca1/6672
UTAI1 CO'* »RT OF APPEALS 
UTAH 
DOCUMENT 
K F U 
50 
DOCKET NO. ^O^ft-Cfr 
IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
STATE OF UTAH, : 
Plaintiff and Appellee, : Case No. 950338-CA 
vs. : Priority No. 2 
TIMOTHY KENT REDMOND, 
Defendant and Appellant. : 
BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
THIS IS AN APPEAL FROM A JUDGMENT AND ORDER OF COMMITMENT 
SIGNED AND ENTERED ON APRIL 26, 1995, BY THE HONORABLE 
JOHN R. ANDERSON, IN AND FOR THE EIGHTH DISTRICT COURT, 
UINTAH COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH. THE JUDGMENT AND ORDER OF 
COMMITMENT WAS ENTERED AFTER A JURY TRIAL IN WHICH THE 
JURY HAD FOUND DEFENDANT/APPELLANT GUILTY OF POSSESSION 
OF STOLEN PROPERTY, UTAH CODE ANN. SECTION 76-6-408, A 
SECOND DEGREE FELONY. 
Mark T. Ethington (4828) 
DAY & BARNEY 
45 E. Vine Street 
Murray, UT 84107 
(801) 262-6800 
Attorney for Defendant-Appellant 
Jan C. Graham 
Attorney General 
Jim Beadles 
Assistant Attorney General 
236 State Capitol 
Salt Lake City, UT 84114 
Attorneys for Plaintiff-Appellee 
FILED 
FEB 2 0 1996 
COURT OF APPEALS 
IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff and Appellee, 
vs. 
TIMOTHY KENT REDMOND, 
Defendant and Appellant. 
Case No. 950338-CA 
Priority No. 2 
BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
THIS IS AN APPEAL FROM A JUDGMENT AND ORDER OF COMMITMENT 
SIGNED AND ENTERED ON APRIL 26, 1995, BY THE HONORABLE 
JOHN R. ANDERSON, IN AND FOR THE EIGHTH DISTRICT COURT, 
UINTAH COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH. THE JUDGMENT AND ORDER OF 
COMMITMENT WAS ENTERED AFTER A JURY TRIAL IN WHICH THE 
JURY HAD FOUND DEFENDANT/APPELLANT GUILTY OF POSSESSION 
OF STOLEN PROPERTY, UTAH CODE ANN. SECTION 76-6-408, A 
SECOND DEGREE FELONY. 
Mark T. Ethington (4828) 
DAY & BARNEY 
45 E. Vine Street 
Murray, UT 84107 
(801) 262-6800 
Attorney for Defendant-Appellant 
Jan C. Graham 
Attorney General 
Jim Beadles 
Assistant Attorney General 
236 State Capitol 
Salt Lake City, UT 84114 
Attorneys for Plaintiff-Appellee 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
Page 
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES ii 
JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS 1 
ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL AND STANDARDS OF APPELLATE 
REVIEW 1 
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES AND RULES 2 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 3 
RELEVANT FACTS 3 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 9 
POINT I APPELLANT WAS DENIED HIS CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT 
TO AN IMPARTIAL JURY 10 




TABLE OF AUTHORITIES 
CASES CITED 
Page 
State v. Wright, 893 P.2d 1113 (Utah App. 1995) 2, 14 
Gee v. Smith, 541 P.2d 6 (Utah 1975) 2, 11 
Huahes v. Bora. 898 F.2d 695 (9th Cir. 1990) 14 
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS. STATUTES AND RULES 
Article 1 Section 12 of the Utah Constitution 2, 11 
Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution 2, 10 
Utah Code Ann. Section 76-6-408 (1953 as amended) 2, 15 
Utah Code Ann. Section 77-1-6(f) (1953 as amended) . . . . 2 
ii 
IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff and Appellee, 
vs. 
TIMOTHY KENT REDMOND, 
Defendant and Appellant 
Case no. 950338-CA 
BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS 
This is an appeal from a Judgment and Order of Commitment 
signed and entered on April 26, 1995, by the Honorable John R. 
Anderson, in and for the Eighth District Court, Uintah County, 
State of Utah. The Judgment and Order of Commitment was entered 
after a jury trial in which the jury had found defendant/appellant 
guilty of possession of stolen property, Utah Code Ann. section 
76-6-408, a second degree felony. This Court has appellate 
jurisdiction under Utah Code Ann. section 78-2a-3(2)(f) (Supp. 
1992), and Rule 26(2) (a), Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure. 
ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL 
AND 
STANDARDS OF APPELLATE REVIEW 
1. Was there insufficient evidence for the jury to find 
1 
defendant guilty? The standard of review is was the evidence 
sufficiently inconclusive or inherently improbable that reasonable 
minds must have entertained a reasonable doubt that the defendant 
committed the crime of which he was convicted. See, State v. 
Wright. 893 P.2d 1113 (Utah App. 1995) . 
2. Did the court calendar, which was posted near the jury 
check-in area, and which indicated that appellant was to have a 
disposition hearing on other criminal charges, prejudice the jury 
panel in this case to such an extent that the defendant was not 
afforded his right to a fair and impartial jury? The standard of 
review is would the notice on the calendar probably have had an 
influence on the verdict. See, Gee v. Smith, 541 P.2d 6 (Utah 
1975) . 
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES AND RULES 
The Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution reads, 
in relevant part: 
In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the 
right to a speedy and public trial, by an impartial jury .... 
Article 1 Section 12 of the Utah Constitution is also 
relevant, and reads substantially the same. Also, Utah Code Ann. 
section 77-1-6(f) (1953 as amended), is applicable, and reads 
substantially the same. 
Section 76-6-408 Utah Code Ann. (1953 as amended), reads: 
A person commits theft if he receives, retains, or disposes of 
2 
the property of another knowing that it has been stolen, or 
believing that it probably has been stolen, or who conceals, 
sells, withholds or aids in concealing, selling, or 
withholding the property from the owner, knowing the property 
to be stolen, intending to deprive the owner of it. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Appellant was charged with possession of stolen property, a 
cond degree felony. (R. 1). A jury trial was held on March 10, 
95. The jury found appellant guilty as charged. Pursuant to the 
ilty verdict, Judge Anderson signed and entered a Judgment and 
ier of Commitment on April 26, 1995. (R. 130) . Pursuant to this 
figment and Order of Commitment, appellant is presently 
^arcerated at the Utah State Prison. 
RELEVANT FACTS 
1. Before the trial began, the court clerk posted a calendar 
the bulletin board near the area where the members of the jury 
lei were to report. (R. 204). 
2. At the top of the calendar was the notice for the jury 
Lai for which the panel members were reporting, and immediately 
Low this notice was a notice of a "disposition hearing" for 
pellant in another case where he was charged with theft of 
rvices. (R. 58). 
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3. Trial counsel for appellant1 saw the calendar, took it 
down, and brought it to the attention of Judge Anderson and the 
Uintah County attorney, Joann Stringham. (R. 204). 
4. In dealing with this potentially prejudicial material, 
Judge Anderson asked both counsel, "how can we deal with that?" (R. 
205) . 
5. Counsel for the State responded, "let's end it right now 
and call a new jury a week from now. I watch the jury, and they 
watch the bulletin board." (R. 205) . 
6. The court clerk suggested that panelists that had checked 
in prior to the calendar being taken down could be automatically 
excused. (R. 206) . 
7. It was suggested by counsel for the State that Judge 
Anderson could ask the remainder of the panel if any of them had 
seen the calendar. Judge Anderson indicated he was not comfortable 
with that suggestion as it might alert the remainder of the panel 
that appellant may have other cases. (R. 207). 
8. Although it was impossible to determine for sure how many 
panelists actually saw the calendar, Judge Anderson decided to 
simply excuse the five that had definitely checked in prior to the 
approximate time the calendar was taken down, and then not ask the 
xTrial counsel for appellant was Alan Williams. He 
subsequently withdrew as counsel for appellant after the jury 
trial. 
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remaining panelists if any had seen the calendar. The decision was 
not objected to by either counsel. (R. 218). 
9. During the trial, appellant testified on his own behalf, 
and admitted on direct examination that he had been convicted 
previously of forgery a few years prior to the present charge. (R. 
404) . | 
10. At or near the beginning of the empaneling of the jury, 
Judge Anderson read the Information to the panelists. The State 
alleged through the Information that the property that appellant 
supposedly had possession of was an "operable motor vehicle." (R. 
1 and 239, 240) . 
11. At the conclusion of the trial, Judge Anderson instructed 
the jury that one of the elements they had to find beyond a 
reasonable doubt before appellant could be convicted was that the 
property in question was an "operable" motor vehicle. (R. 77) . 
12. During the course of the trial the State presented 
several witnesses. One of which was Lee Berge, a used car salesman 
from Orem. He testified that on or about September 23, 1994, he 
noticed missing from his inventory a red 1985 Mazda with a VIN of 
JM1BD2316F0819150. (R. 297,298, and 302) . He reported the vehicle 
to the Orem police as stolen. Mr. Berge also indicated that the 
vehicle was from Arizona, and had an Arizona title. (R. 3 02). 
13. On or about September 23, 1994, other state witnesses 
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testified that they saw appellant in possession of a red Mazda, but 
they indicated that this vehicle had Washington plates. (R. 349) . 
14. Another witness, Andrea Hardman, indicated that sometime 
in September of 1994, she became acquainted with appellant because 
he was dating her sister. She indicated that she saw appellant in 
possession of a blue Mazda and a red Mazda, and that at various 
times she was interested in purchasing both of the vehicles. (R. 
348 - 350) . 
15. Andrea testified that on one occasion it appeared to her 
that appellant was changing parts between the two vehicles. (R. 
350). Andrea further testified that on the evening of October 7, 
1994, she and her husband went to appellant's residence to inquire 
about purchasing the red Mazda. It was at this time that Andrea 
indicated that the vehicle was "all tore up." and that "it 
wouldn't run anymore." (R. 354). 
16. Andrea testified that appellant said that since the 
vehicle was all tore up and wouldn't run anymore that he would give 
it to her for parts, and that she didn't need to license it since 
was just a parts car. (R. 354 - 356) . 
17. Andrea testified that she saw appellant between 5:00 and 
7:00 pm. on the evening of October 7th (R. 368), and that, because 
the vehicle was inoperable, they pushed it to her residence 
sometime between 6:30 and 7:00 pm. (R. 3 69) , and that the last time 
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she saw appellant that evening was sometime between 8:30 and 9:30 
pm. (R. 369). 
18. Andrea testified that after they had pushed the vehicle 
to their house they began to suspect that the vehicle may have been 
stolen due to appellant's alleged comments. The next day they 
called the police to investigate. (R. 331). | 
19. The officer who investigated discovered that the VIN on 
the vehicle at the Hardman residence matched the VIN of the red 
Mazda reported stolen from Mr. Berge. (R. 330). 
20. This officer did not take any fingerprints from the red 
Mazda. (R. 138). 
21. Diane Davis, another witness for the State, testified 
that she saw appellant and Ms. Hardman pushing the vehicle on 
October 7th between 8:00 and 8:30 pm. (R. 386). 
22. Doug Hardman, Andrea Hardman7s husband, testified that he 
saw appellant and Andrea pushing the red Mazda between 4:00 and 
4:30 pm. on October 7th. (R. 459). 
23. Floyd Collette, an LDS bishop, testified on appellant's 
behalf, and indicated that he met with appellant and Kris Redmond2 
on the evening of October 7th, at about 7:00 pm. and that he met 
with them for about 15 minutes, and that appellant was neatly 
2Appellant and Kris Redmond were dating at the time, and 
subsequently married. 
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dressed. (R. 395, 396) . 
24. Rachel Bezzant testified on appellant's behalf, and 
indicated that sometime in November of 1994, she purchased from 
appellant a red 1982 Mazda for $100.00, and that although appellant 
didn't have a title to the vehicle, she was able to acquire one 
later through the State of Utah without any complications. (R. 
400) . She further testified that the VIN on the vehicle she 
purchased from appellant was JM1BD2310C0605816, which is different 
than the VIN of the vehicle which the officer investigated. (R. 
401) . 
25. Appellant testified on his own behalf, and indicated that 
he did have possession of a red Mazda during the times in question, 
but that it was a 1982 Mazda that he had purchased from a man by 
the name of Antonio Vigil in Springville, Utah, on September 24, 
1994. (R. 407). 
26. Appellant testified that on October 7th that he and Kris 
left Salt Lake City about 4:00 pm. to go to Vernal to talk to 
Bishop Collette about financial assistance. It took them about two 
hours and 45 minutes to make the trip. He met with Bishop Collette 
about 7:00 pm. and then he drove his blue Mazda back to Salt Lake 
City, and Kris drove the red Mazda back to Salt Lake City. At no 
time did he meet with Andrea Hardman that evening, at no time did 
he offer to give the car to her for parts, and at no time did he 
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tell her not to license it, and at no time did he push the car to 
her residence. (R. 413 - 415). 
27. Kris Redmond testified and corroborated what appellant 
had testified to concerning the events of the evening of October 
7th. (R. 441) . 
28. There was no evidence presented that appellant 
participated in a theft of the vehicle in Orem, and there was no 
evidence admitted that appellant supposedly made any confessions 
that he knew the car was stolen. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
Appellant was denied a trial by an "impartial" jury because of 
the court calendar which indicated to all who looked at it, 
including potential jury panelists, that appellant had other 
pending criminal charges. Although Judge Anderson attempted to 
alleviate this problem by excusing some of the panelists, to make 
sure there was not any chance of partiality, he should have 
followed the prosecutor's initial suggestion to come back in a week 
and start all over again with a new panel. Even though appellant 
freely admitted that he had a previous forgery conviction, there is 
no question that if a jury member knew that appellant currently had 
other pending charges, the cumulative affect would certainly have 
an influence on the verdict, especially when the credibility of the 
appellant was a key issue. 
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There was insufficient evidence to convict appellant because 
the testimony given by the State's witnesses was inconclusive in 
that the car reportedly stolen was from Arizona and the State's 
witnesses said the car they saw appellant in possession of had 
Washington plates; and in that three different State's witnesses 
said appellant was pushing the car at three different times on 
October 7th; and in that the state's witnesses said the vehicle was 
inoperable; and in that the investigating officer failed to take 
fingerprints from the vehicle which could have conclusively 
indicated who had possession of the vehicle; and in that there was 
no direct evidence that appellant knew the car was stolen. 
Furthermore, the testimony of the State's witnesses as to the 
events of October 7th was inherently improbable in that how could 
appellant be in work clothes and pushing a car to another residence 
at about the same time Bishop Collette said that he was meeting 
with appellant, and appellant was neatly dressed. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT ONE 
APPELLANT WAS DENIED HIS CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT TO AN IMPARTIAL 
JURY. 
The Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution 
guarantees that " in all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall 




 In the case of Gee v. Smith. 541 P.2d 6 (Utah 1975), the 
defendant in that case also claimed that he was denied his right to 
an impartial jury because of some photographs that were shown to a 
member of the jury outside of the courtroom. Id. at 6, 7. The 
Utah Supreme Court held in Gee that, since there were other 
photographs of the victim shown to the jury in the courtroom, the 
photograph seen out of the courtroom probably had no prejudicial 
effect. Id. at 7. However, in reaching this conclusion, the Utah 
Supreme focused on whether it appeared that the extrajudicial 
material "had an influence on producing the verdict rendered." Id. 
at 7. Consequently, what must be determined in this case is first, 
whether members of the jury were exposed to material or evidence 
outside of the trial proceedings, and second, if that material 
could have had an influence on the verdict rendered. 
It was acknowledged by Judge Anderson and the prosecutor that 
the jury pool was exposed to potentially prejudicial material by 
the clerk of the court posting the court calendar in an area where 
the jury panelists were congregating, with the calendar indicating 
immediately below the trial notice that appellant was also to 
appear for a disposition hearing on another charge of theft of 
services. In attempting to resolve this problem, Judge Anderson 
3Article 1 section 12 of the Utah Constitution, and section 
77-1-6(1) (f) , also articulate this right under Utah state law with 
essentially the same language as the Sixth Amendment. 
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decided to simply excuse those jurors that they knew had checked in 
prior to the approximate time that the calendar was taken down. 
But admittedly, it was impossible to determine with 100% certainty 
which panelists had seen the calendar, and which ones hadn't. There 
may have been other panelists who saw the calendar just before it 
was taken down and before they actually checked in with the clerk. 
To be absolutely certain, Judge Anderson could have asked the 
remaining panelists if any had looked at the court calendar that 
day. Judge Anderson was correct in indicating that there certainly 
would be some risk in doing that, in that it may alert some 
panelists that the defendant may have some other cases before the 
court, but it is submitted that the risk actually would have been 
minimal. All Judge Anderson would have had to do was ask "who has 
seen the court calendar this morning?!|, and then, if any raised 
their hands, he could have interviewed each one in chambers to 
ascertain what they had seen. 
Where important constitutional rights are concerned, such as 
the right to an impartial jury, the benefit of the doubt should be 
given to the defendant, and if the judge felt too uncomfortable in 
asking the remaining panelists if any had seen the calendar, then 
he should have followed the prosecutor's recommendation to come 
back the following week with a completely new panel. That way 
there would be no question that the jury was not prejudiced in any 
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manner by the court calendar. As it is, there is a significant 
lingering question. 
The second question is, assuming a jury member may have seen 
the calendar indicating appellant had other criminal charges, could 
that knowledge have influenced the verdict in this case, even 
though appellant freely admitted in his own testimony that he had 
a prior conviction for forgery? The answer is yes! 
The reason for this conclusion is that in a trial of this 
nature, where the jurors are attempting to decide between 
conflicting stories, the perceived credibility of the witnesses is 
of ultimate significance, and where a juror may know that a witness 
has other criminal convictions, that knowledge could certainly tip 
the scales in favor of not believing him. True, the jurors in this 
case had in-court knowledge that appellant had a prior felony 
conviction. However, it is the cumulative effect of knowing that 
there is yet a third criminal charge against the defendant. 
knowing of one prior conviction would certainly alert the juror to 
maybe examine the witness' testimony with scrutiny, but knowing 
that there are additional convictions would almost certainly nail 
the coffin shut, so to speak, on any possibility of the jury 
accepting the witness' veracity. It would be too easy at that 
point to simply believe that the witness is repeatedly being 
charged with criminal behavior, and should not be believed at all, 
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and that is apparently what happened in the instant case. Even 
though the State's witnesses were inconsistent on significant 
points, and even though the appellant had three alibi witnesses, 
the jury totally disregarded that evidence and found the appellant 
guilty. 
The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals has held that "...jurors 
have a correlative duty to consider only evidence that is presented 
in open court; and when it appears that the jury has obtained or 
used extraneous material, the defendant is entitled to a new trial 
if there is a reasonable possibility that such material could have 
affected the verdict." See, Hughes v. Bora, 898 F.2d 695 (9th Cir. 
1990) . Such should be the result here. At a minimum, appellant 
should be entitled to a new trial so as to remove even the 
possibility that the jury could be tainted by the knowledge that 
the appellant had several criminal convictions. 
POINT II 
THERE WAS INSUFFICIENT EVIDENCE TO CONVICT THE APPELLANT 
This Court has held that "we will upset the jury verdict only 
when the evidence, so viewed, is sufficiently inconclusive or 
inherently improbable that reasonable minds must have entertained 
a reasonable doubt that the defendant committed the crime of which 
he was convicted." See, State v. Wright, 893 P. 2d 1113, 1117 (Utah 
14 
App. 1995). The State's evidence was sufficiently inconclusive 
and/or inherently improbable in the following particulars. 
First, one of the elements that Judge Anderson instructed the 
jury that they had to find beyond a reasonable doubt was that the 
vehicle in question was an "operable" motor vehicle. The evidence 
on this point was for the most part contrary to showing that the 
vehicle was operable. The State's key witness, Andrea Hardman, 
testified that the car appeared "all tore up" and "it wouldn't run 
anymore." That is why they presumably had to push it to her 
residence. It was inconclusive as to whether the State had shown 
that the vehicle was operable. 
Next, the used car dealer from Orem testified that the car 
that was supposedly taken from his lot was from Arizona with an 
Arizona title. However, the State's own witnesses testified that 
the red Mazda they saw appellant in had Washington plates on it. 
The issue of whether appellant actually ever had possession of the 
car that was reported stolen is inconclusive. 
Next, if it is believed that appellant did actually have 
possession of the vehicle that was reported stolen, there is no 
direct evidence that appellant knew that it was stolen or believed 
that it was stolen as required by section 76-6-408, Utah Code Ann. 
(1953 as amended). There was no evidence presented by the State 
indicating that appellant was actually involved in the theft of the 
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vehicle. In addition, none of the State's witnesses ever said that 
appellant admitted that he knew it was stolen. Consequently, what 
the jury was left to do is infer that appellant must have known 
that the car was stolen based on circumstantial evidence such as 
the disputed allegations that he did not have a title to the 
vehicle, that he was going to give it to Andrea Hardman for parts, 
and that he told Andrea that she didn't need to license it because 
it was just a parts car. These allegations are inconclusive in 
showing that appellant must have known the car was stolen. If 
indeed, it was being given away as parts, then appellant would be 
completely justified in telling Andrea that she didn't need to 
license it. 
Next, three of the State's key witnesses were drastically 
inconsistent on the time of day that appellant supposedly pushed 
the vehicle to Andrea's residence. Andrea said it was between 6:30 
and 7:00 pm., Diane Davis said it was between 8:30 and 9:00 pm., 
and Mr. Hardman said it was between 4:00 and 4:30 pm. Admittedly, 
it would be expected for there to be some variance when witnesses 
are estimating times that events happened. However, the 
differences here are too significant. For example, there is a five 
hour difference between the testimonies of Mr. Hardman and Diane 
Davis. These inconsistencies make it inconclusive as to whether 
appellant actually did push the car to Andrea's residence, 
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especially in light of the fact that appellant presented witnesses 
to indicate that he wasn't even available to do the purported acts. 
Next, this case could have been easily decided if the 
investigating officer had taken fingerprints from inside the 
vehicle as he should have done. If appellant had been driving in 
the vehicle, and if he had been working in and around the vehicle, 
and if he had pushed it to Andrea's house, all as the State's 
witnesses allege, any reasonable person would conclude that 
appellant's fingerprints would be somewhere in or on the vehicle. 
However, for whatever reason, the officer neglected to have 
fingerprints taken. Once again, the net result is that the 
evidence is inconclusive as to whether appellant actually did have 
possession of the vehicle. 
Next, it is inherently improbable that appellant could have 
been in work clothes, and could have been pushing a car to Andrea's 
house at about 7:00 pm. when Bishop Collette testified that he met 
with appellant and Kris Redmond at 7:00 pm., and appellant was 
neatly dressed. 
Because of the inconclusiveness and inherent improbability of 
the evidence on many of the key issues in this case, there is no 
question that the jury should have entertained some reasonable 
doubt and found appellant not guilty. 
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CONCLUSION 
Because there was insufficient evidence to show that appellant 
either had possession of the stolen vehicle, or, assuming he did 
have possession, that he knew it was stolen, the verdict of the 
jury should be overturned. At a minimum, appellant should receive 
a new trial due to the possible prejudicial effect of the court 
calendar indicating that appellant had other criminal convictions. 
Respectfully submitted this day of February, 1996. 
Mark T. Ethingtpn 
Attorney for Appellant 
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